Redefining the ‘Centre’: International Economic Law and Grand Strategy in a Multipolar World

by Horia Ciurtin LL.M., Managing Editor of the EFILA Blog*

(Legal) Multipolarity Revisited: What Lies Beyond Westphalia?

This brief introduction to such an ambitious thematic must undoubtedly commence by positing its adherence to the (non-legal) core concept of ‘grand strategy’ and its realist avatars in international economic law. More precisely, it shall be argued that – at a certain level – the normative sphere is instrumentalised by competing nomothetic actors in order to enhance their power position and joint economic security, in a troubled multipolar world.

Thus, following John Mearsheimer’s influential paradigm and his (in)famous 1994 article regarding the false promise of international institutions, it can be affirmed that the “[international] institutions are basically a reflection of distribution of power in the world” and that the most powerful actors in the system “create and shape institutions so that they can maintain their share of world power, or even increase it”. For these reasons, international law and its main agents – international institutions – represent a formalised, but temporary consensus in the clash of competing interests.

However, this side of the story is entirely accurate only for an international arena dominated solely by sovereign state actors. Presently, as the Westphalian international system of autarchic legalities disintegrates, paving the way for a post-sovereign order, a different relation between legal macro-spaces (or, as Carl Schmitt famously called them, Grossräume) seems to emerge. New power blocs are forged from the global economic bellum omnium contra omnes, allowing them to surpass the notion of sovereignty and building stranger ‘empires’ bound together by the cold letter of international treaties which – eventually – develops into a more stable quasi-constitutional internal order.

The European Union, the NAFTA space and the Eurasian Union are just a few examples of this trend. Each of these blocs implies a loss or – at least – a limitation of state sovereignty in several fields, in the quest for attaining the upper hand in a larger global confrontation with other blocs or singular actors. In a certain way, some sovereignty is individually lost so that the sovereigns might increase its projected power in a joint manner, following their grand strategy for hegemony.

In such circumstances, the classical balance of power cannot any longer occur between single states and their shifting alliances, but rather among macro-spaces united in formal legal agreements (later turned into quasi-constitutional orders). Even though, as posited by Mearsheimer and other realists, self-interest and the desire for hegemony might drive sovereigns into such legal constructs, their origin does not account for their further development.

Thus, once roaming the international arena, macro-spaces appear as a new breed of economic ‘predators’, more powerful and more fit for survival than the sovereigns taken separately, factor which convinces such states that a (post)sovereign structural alignment might take them further in the quest for power and hegemony, despite having to share some part of the spoils with the co-victors.

Normative Mimesis: Imperial Weapon or Remedy for Lingering Divisions?

In such a context, can we still refer to a truly international system or just a series of regional sub-orders that economically interact in an episodic manner? Is the international order now also territorially fragmented, in addition to the already decried functional fragmentation?

If once upon an idealist time, ‘autonomous’ normative systems – such as FTAs, BITs, multilateral trade agreements – and the institutions that administrate them were thought to act as gap-filling mechanisms, offering a cohesive and coherent paradigm to an otherwise centrifugal setting, the new global paradigm reveals the original realist tenet.

More precisely, major power brokers – be it soft or traditional – use such instruments for their own strategic goals. While alignment with like-actors is carefully negotiated in a quest for convergence of paradigms and tactics, the relationship with non-aligned or competing actors is defined in different terms, seeking to advocate for rules that would attract the other in one’s own normative realm.

Setting an example, triggers normative mimesis. A ‘centre’ dominates the periphery solely by creating a model. With a model consistent enough, advocated by an actor strong enough (often adversarial), there commences a process of legal emulation and ‘bandwagoning’. The ones left on the margins will try to imitate the centre’s model in order to gain recognition and reflect its power. Once the peripheries and non-aligned actors had been attracted in the ‘gravitational’ area of a hegemonic actor, other hegemons might succumb to the newly created rules. Imitation is the beginning of legal dominion.

However, such a strategic ‘great game’ in the field of international economic law might not have results as cynical as its origins appear to be. The ailing divisions and fragmentation of this system might benefit from mimetic normativism, forcing reluctant actors in one direction or another and opening the path to an ‘imposed’ con vergence, but nonetheless convergence.

Between TPP and TTIP: Where is the ‘Centre’ of the World?

Such realities and tactics is what determined the BIT ‘European gold standard’ to be quasi-universal in the 20th century. It attracted in its sphere of legal influence both the north-American actors, the ‘Third World’, the Communist and post-Communist states. With few exceptions, such a model became the undisputed norm in international investment law. The trend set by EU (EC) member states in their bilateral relations reverberated across the globe, enveloping former colonies and present allies, benefactors and adversaries, richer and poorer states, without limits or tactical setbacks.

However, the first actor to start diverging from the model was undoubtedly the United States. Near the turn of the century, its FTAs and ‘model BITs’ were developed in an innovative way, reflecting a change of options and a new geopolitical framework. Part of another grand strategy, the US new FTAs and model BITs offered an alternative to the classical ‘neat’ European-inspired BIT, advocating a more expansive view upon international trade and investment.

Following this pattern, the US began the negotiation of two ample FTAs (including consistent investment chapters) along its new comprehensive trade and investment policy. Concentrating in ‘crossing’ both oceans, the US crafted a strategy of gaining an intermediary position between its Asian alterity and European kinship, acting both as a bridge and unavoidable toll-house. With this goal in mind, the US acted so as to transform itself into the epicentre of a globalised world that seems to be increasingly multipolar. Thus, in its design, even though the international arena is unavoidable moving towards plurality, the actors need not be of equal rank. Asymmetry reigns even better in a multipolar setting, allowing north America to be the utmost centre among several centres.

TPP. The first of these two agreements – TPP – involved the strategic lines of concentrating on the Asian ‘pivot’ and attracted twelve states from all around the Pacific Rim (both from North/South America, Asia and Australia), in a multilateral effort to create an open economic space. However, everybody seemed (and still seems) to diplomatically ignore the geopolitical elephant in the room: the total absence of China from the negotiations. If this was merely a legal-economic instrument, such a choice and development would have proved incomprehensible.

If, on the other hand, one analysed the situation (geo)politically, it might lead to different conclusions: (a) either this is one initial step of a ‘containment’ strategy directed against China, (b) or the relationship with China is a privileged one, deserving a bilateral approach between two sovereigns of equal calibre.

Nonetheless, even though China is the great absentee in the TPP game, the conclusion of this agreement – with its myriad of typically American exceptions and derogations – sets the scene for any further development of this legal sphere. The TPP example has been set and – with some effort – it will be ratified and come into full force before the US finishes the negotiations with other high-profile ‘centres’ such, representing a ‘living’ precedent that might compel other actors to follow this model or – at least – to make substantial concessions from their previous practice in the FTA/IIA area.

TTIP. As regards the negotiation of the comprehensive agreement with the European Union, the situation proved to be different from the outset. The 28 member states had a single voice in the negotiation (unlike the 11 Pacific states) with the US and their joint economies accounted for a higher power. One EU tactic for reaching an initial negotiation equilibrium was not to approach the US as part of a larger NAFTA space, but rather to take on individually each of the NAFTA states. Therefore, in the TTIP process, asymmetry was less evident and no decisive ‘upper hands’ appeared during the game.

Moreover, the EU itself also managed to have its ‘model’ tested and set out, in the FTA with Singapore and in the finalised agreement with Canada. At the same time, it also began a more ample FTA programme, envisioning a deal with Vietnam, India, South Korea and – eventually – China. Thus, the EU also strives to be the trend-setter in the FTA/IIA area, introducing its own innovations and idiosyncrasies, concentrating upon Asia and the Pacific Rim itself.

In these circumstances, TPP, EUFSTA, CETA proved to be a ‘prologue’ to the much anticipated clash of EU and US during TTIP negotiations, leaving both actors bound to their own models and with less room for manoeuvre. However, what keeps them wired to the endless rounds of negotiations (so far, eleven) is the idea that – once such an agreement reached – it will transform these two ‘centres’ in a formally allied mega-centre that irremediably sets the example for the entire world.

This is the reason for which each actor wishes to see its own model enshrined in TTIP. Once there, it will be the model. And the normative mimesis triggered thereafter will emulate the rules of the hegemon that managed to formalise its legal strategy in such an influential agreement.


 * Horia Ciurtin, Managing Editor, EFILA Blog; Legal Adviser – International Arbitration, Scandic Distilleries S.A; Editor, VERSO Journal [Romania]; Freelance researcher [see SSRN author page].

 

Transnational Court of Investment Arbitration

by Duarte G. Henriques, BCH Advocados*

In the context of the discussions surrounding the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), much criticism has been raised against ISDS (Investor-State Dispute Settlement). We know now that the European Parliament echoed public complaints and voted against the inclusion of an ISDS mechanism in the TTIP. It further recommended to the European Commission that disputes falling under the investment protection framework should be adjudicated by a system similar to state courts, where the decision-makers are appointed from among judges from the US, EU and third countries. Accordingly, the proposal advances the creation of a new court system (Investment Court System) consisting of a Tribunal of First Instance and an Appeal Tribunal.

At the same time, this proposal resonates the suspicions raised regarding the lack of impartiality of some arbitrators and paves the way to the implementation of an adjudication system subject to public scrutiny.

However meritorious it could be, this idea nevertheless forecloses the right of the investor to (at least) participate in the process of selection of the decision-maker, a principle paramount to international arbitration stemming from the distrust of a system where the adjudicator might be swayed by parochial views, not to mention political and economic pressures.

I am still not convinced that an arbitral system is not apt to provide a neutral, impartial and independent means for solving disputes between foreign investors and host states. But I do not look at the current ISDS status quo without some hesitation either, especially if we think of the system instituted by ICSID, its locations positioning and its “ad hoc committee” revision method. The circumstance that the ICSID system operates under the aegis of a banking institution (World Bank) lending money to sovereign states, but at the same time with a level of financial power strong enough to go as far as to impose changes in regulation, and in the economic and political environment of those countries, gives room for criticism concerning its bias in favour of investors. This criticism has led a few nations (Venezuela and Bolivia, for instance) to withdraw from the ICSID Convention, claiming that BITs were made to protect “investments” and not “investors”.

On the other hand, at first glance I do not have to struggle with the idea of waiving the principle of finality of arbitral awards: indeed, why not submit the arbitral decision to a revision similar to the state courts system of appeals? In my country, foreign investors wishing to pursue their claims before the state courts are given the right to appeal against the decision. This right to appeal, however, is subject to limitations: it may be restricted to a single level of appeal (usually the “Court of Appeal”), and it only comprises the revision of the factual findings if the decision contains “egregious” errors of determination. Interpretation and application of the legal rules are subject to full revision.

That being said, a suggestion (and here I underline that the following is a mere suggestion, subject to further development) might be put forward to create an international body for settling investment disputes. Most likely, the idea has already been suggested, but in any case, I will dare to name it as the “Transnational Court of Investment Arbitration”.

Explaining the idea involves speaking about each of its four words.

Firstly, it would be a Court in the sense that it consists of a permanent institutional body with permanent facilities, structured in the same fashion as traditional state courts, and permanently dedicated staff. Arbitrators would be vested with “jus imperii” powers. Witnesses would be subject to criminal prosecution in the case of false statements, disobedience, and similar behaviour. Arbitrators, counsel, parties’ representatives, witnesses, experts, secretaries and other administrative staff would be submitted to a single regulation system, including a Code of Ethics.

Secondly, it would be a body dedicated exclusively to settling disputes between foreign investors and host states. Therefore, it would be an “Investment” Court. Underlying this notion is the consideration of the jurisdictional issue, that is, discovering, inter alia, what kind of legal instrument would afford a protection under this ISDS to the relevant “investments”. As long as an international instrument protecting foreign investments provides for arbitration as a mechanism to solve disputes arising therefrom, the Transnational Court would hold jurisdiction.

Thirdly, however closely this body might resemble a traditional “court”, it would be an institution managing arbitration (and possibly mediation in a two-tiered process). Therefore, parties are allowed to appoint their arbitrators, but also to have a tailor-made proceeding, including waiving of the right to appeal and the setting-up of time schedules, costs, bifurcation, and so on and so forth. Given the particularities of this kind of arbitration – which deals with public interests of the states involved – the right to appeal and public hearings would be set-up by default. Of course, the “traditional” requirements as to the independence, impartiality and neutrality of the adjudicators would apply, and this institution would act as an appointing authority as well (chair and arbitrators not appointed by defaulting parties). Final awards would “circulate” (that is, would be enforceable with no need for prior recognition) within the territory of all jurisdictions adhering to this system and within the geographic perimeter of the New York Convention of 1958.

Lastly, it would be a transnational court, in the sense that would cover all jurisdictions adhering to this system, potentially within the context of a multilateral free-trade agreement. That brings us to the potential to use an existing legal and institutional setting, such as the WTO, and be attached to it at the logistical level. However, it would be more than that. It would have to be a body truly independent from the states adhering to the international convention enacting this system.

Of course, it would be necessary to provide for initial financial funding from contracting states until reaching a “cruising speed” where the system would be financially self-sustained concerning maintenance and administrative costs.

Its state constituency would democratically elect the managing and supervising bodies by “one country one vote”.

Another concern related to the current ISDS system is its geographic accessibility. Currently, investment disputes are managed in Washington (ICSID) or The Hague (PCA), with hearing locations settled in association with arbitral institutions such as the DIS in Germany, the CIETAC in China or the Singapore International Arbitration Centre in Singapore. This concern suggests the notion of spreading a few regional or continental sub-Courts (or Courts of First Instance) across the globe. The distribution would be drawn according to the caseload currently brought by investors against host states. Looking below at the last statistics available at the ICSID website (2015-2), we could think of the following continental or regional Sub-Courts and respective locations: 1) South America, in Chile or Uruguay; 2) Western Europe, in Warsaw or Kiev; 3) Eastern Europe, in Geneva, Paris or London; 4) North America and Central America, in New York or Miami; 5) Africa, in Cairo, Egypt or Abuja, Nigeria; 6) Australasia, in Sydney; 7) Asia, in Beijing or HK.

graph

This system would include what we may call “intra-EU” disputes, that is, disputes between European investors and EU member states.

The first instance level of this system would be topped by a “Superior Court” based on a movable location for a term of 5 to 10 years. Contrary to the “first instance” level, where the decision-makers would be arbitrators chosen by the parties, the jurisdictional body of the Superior Court would consist of the President of the highest Courts of Justice of each contracting state. With the exception of “egregious” determinations of facts, the Superior Court would have jurisdiction on matters of law only, and its decisions would be published.


Duarte G. Henriques, Rua Fialho de Almeida – 32 – 1 E, 1070-129 Lisbon • Portugal, dghenriques@bch.ptwww.bch.pt.

Right to Regulation & Investment Court System: Alternative to ISDS? (Part II) – Mediation in Investor-State Dispute: An Option 

 Pratyush Nath Upreti*, Upreti & Associates

In my previous contribution to the EFILA blog, titled Right to Regulation & Investment Court System: Alternative to ISDS?, I analyzed the debate raised by the ISDS provision in TTIP and how the proposed Investment Court may not be able to solve the issues raised by ISDS. It is important to analyze the reasons behind such a huge cry over ISDS set up in the Trade/Investment Agreement. The European Federation for Investment Law and Arbitration (EFILA) in its paper titled A response to the criticism against ISDS has balanced an analysis on the criticism of ISDS.

It is evident that in recent years, there has been a diversion of opinions, which is painful to investors and also encroaching on the national matters of State. Therefore, the global community has to realize that the present ISDS is not always working effectively and alternatives should be proposed. The European Commission’s proposed ‘Investment Court’ might be a step towards formulating an alternative.  No doubt that the proposal is a good attempt but it still needs to be revised.

Recent Trends of International Investment Agreements

In recent years, more countries have been opting for IIAs to continue their existing co-operation with countries or as a way to find an economic development. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), there has been rapid growth of IIA from 1980 till 2014 (see Figure 1.)

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Figure 1: Trends of IIAs (Preliminary data for 2014UNCTAD, IIA database)

The above graph highlights the recent trends of IIAs from 1980-2014. It is expected that IIAs number will increase, but the graph indicates that there has been a decline in the last few years. According to UNCTAD data, in 2004 there were 27 IIAs, out of which 14 were Bilateral Investment treaties (BITs) and 13 were ‘other IIAs’, i.e. economic agreements other than BITs like

Free trade agreements (FTAs), bringing the total number of agreements to 3,268 (2,923 BITs and 345 ‘other IIAs). The total number of IIAs was lower down in 2014 as compared to 2013 where there was a total of 44 IIAs (30 BITs and 14 Other IIAs). The interesting fact is that in 2013 the number of BITs terminated was 148, out of which a new treaty replaced 105, 27 were unilaterally denounced and 16 were terminated by consent.

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Figure 2: Most Active negotiator of ‘other IIAs’; treaties under negotiation and partners involved. Source: UNCTAD, IIA database.

The above figure emphasizes the number of treaties under negotiation and partner countries involved in a negotiation. At present, the European Union has 28 treaties under negotiation among 70 different countries as partners. Although the data highlights seven countries under negotiation, but at present there are 45 countries and four regional integration organizations that are revising their model IIAs.

The findings of UNCTAD data highlights that the countries’ willingness to enter into agreements and few IIAs are under revision. This implies three things. First, negotiation is getting more complex because of the increase in the number of countries in the negotiation process, as every country has a share of interest. Furthermore, even if a deal is negotiated in the broader package, then also the question of commitment to those issues is very important.

Second, the interrelation between IIAs and domestic concerns comprising ‘social, environmental and public health’ matters makes negotiation more difficult. Ignoring this issue means that negotiation has a severe impact on the development of host countries. Therefore, finding the proper balance may take more time, which makes negotiation slow.

Third, some of the most recent investment disputes might show that IIAs go beyond the protection and promotion issues and leave no flexibility on some issues that allow member countries to peruse their development agenda, according to their needs.

Fourth, the transparency in negotiation deals creates a public nuisance on some contingent issues, diverse opinions on other issues, which may or may not be discussed, would have a negative impact on negotiations and, as a result, it creates negative public opinion.

Fifth, recent claims of investors under the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism have raised concern on such negotiation deals particularly such claims are encroaching upon host state sovereignty and domestic regulation.

The critics fear that the growing frivolous claims brought to ISDS will slowly discourage investors and states to opt for ISDS.  The data shows that the average cost of arbitration is $8 million per party. Therefore, at international level, there is a need to offer an alternative, which balances both the interest of investors and states. Moreover, such an alternative should be acceptable by both the parties.

Investor-State Mediation

In recent years, the relationship between the state and investors is getting salvaged. The development will be fragile when rift exists between the investor and state. Parties – for own benefit – use the increasing diverse opinions of the arbitration tribunals. This will result in negative consequences in global investment regime. The possible way to balance the system is by revising ISDS provisions or adopting investor-state mediation.

The very idea of arbitration, mediation and conciliation is to resolve the dispute. Among the three, arbitration is overwhelmingly accepted for several years. The growing criticism of ISDS has sorrowed relation between investors and the State and should be looked at with immediate concern. Perhaps, the time has come to also use the mediation process in Investor-State Disputes. There has been an attempt to use mediation in Investor-state disputes with success in a limited jurisdiction. However, scholars argue the very nature in which mediation aims to settle a dispute is different from arbitration, making it difficult for acceptance of mediation.

According to Jacqueline Nolan-Haley in her work ‘Mediation: The ‘New Arbitration’ argues that “the morality of mediation lies in the optimum settlement, a settlement in which early party gives up what he values less, in return for what he values more. The morality of arbitration lies in a decision according to the law of contract.”  The author explains this observation, as the nature of mediation is more adversarial than that of arbitration.

Similarly, authors Welsh & Schneider in their work ‘Becoming Investor –State Mediation’ (2012) analyze a very fundamental difference between ‘mediation’ and ‘arbitration’. According to the authors, mediation is an ‘interest-based’ system of negotiation, which looks like a meeting. Whereas, ‘arbitration’ is a ‘right-based’ system which looks like a hearing. The very fundamental concept, which the authors are trying to convey, is that the mediation facilitates parties to arrive to a decision unlike arbitration, which focuses on adjudication.  Also, the authors clear the misnomer attached to ‘mediation’. They identify several models of  ‘mediation’ such as ‘facilitative’, ‘elective’, and ‘understanding-focused’, ‘therapeutic’ ‘Humanistic,’ ‘narrative,’ ‘insightful,’ ‘transformative’ and focus on facilitating the development of understanding and ‘integrative (or interest-based) solutions’.

Among these models, the authors suggest adopting a model which will improve relationships between the parties and able to acknowledge volatile political situations.  In other words, the authors suggest the last model as a suitable model in the context of investment treaties. Also somewhere in their article, the authors touch the possibilities of the role of state officials as potential ‘quasi-mediators’. I tend to disagree on this, particularly in the context of investor-state disputes. The role of state officials as quasi-mediators will further complicate the process and may create a trust-deficit environment. Therefore, it is important to note that the very foundation of the mediation process is ‘trust’.

Mediation in Investment Agreements

The recent studies show that mediation has been used with great success in international commercial law. The critics argue that success of mediation in commercial law cannot be an assurance for success in the international investment regime. However, the recent Investment Agreements such as EU-Canada: Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) and ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA) have incorporated ‘mediation’ in their provisions..

Also, mediation features in some Model BITs. For example Article 10.4 of the Thai BIT Model states that:

The disputing parties may at any time agree to good offices, conciliation or mediation. Procedures for good office, conciliation or mediation may begin at any time and may be terminated at any time. Such procedures may continue while the matter is being examined by an arbitral established under this article, unless the disputing parties agree otherwise. Proceedings involving good offices, conciliation and mediation and positions taken by the disputing parties during these proceedings shall be confidential and without prejudice to the rights of disputing investor in any further or other proceedings.

This shows that mediation appears in some Investment Agreements and it is just a matter of time until such practice will gain momentum.

Mediation as an alternative?

There is a diversion of opinion within the scholar’s milieu arguing that arbitration is more favorable than other forms of dispute settlement. However, the recent trends urge us to rethink arbitration and finding beyond the arbitration.  This forum shift has been realized in other international communities, as a result of IBA rules on Mediation developed to encourage good practices of mediation. One of the important features of the IBA rules on mediation gives the liberty to the state to make the mediation process private. This will take away unwanted public opinion.

At the end, I think every modern Investment agreement should include ‘Consultation’ & ‘Mediation’ among the methods for amicable settlement of disputes arising out of International Investment Agreements.  I believe adopting mediation would be a right approach because the process does not abide with a strict interpretation of law unlike in ISDS.

Similarly, the mediation process is a more informal proceeding than ISDS and involvement of a neutral party to the dialogue would give rise to a win-win situation for both parties. Moreover, in the broader sense, the inclusion of mediation in IIAs will make a country less skeptical about consequences of litigating intellectual property rights through regular ISDS mechanism. In other words, the mediation process will help the state to main regulatory rights in the host country.

On the other side, it is important to note that the decision of mediation does not gain force as like of arbitration under the ICSID Convention, making mediation a toothless weapon.  This would be the reason for Europe to opt for ‘Investment Court’ model in spite of reference to mediation in CETA, which is similar to the WTO mediation process for trade dispute settlement.

However, there is a school of thought believing that mediation may create transparency and a proper environment to negotiate between the parties.  But the lack of enforcement of such a decision might make the situation worse.  Therefore, it would not be rational to jump to a conclusion that the ‘mediation’ process will immediately solve the problems raised by ISDS. Moreover, the mediation process is yet to be tested in International Investment Agreements.


Pratyush Nath Upreti – is a Lawyer at Upreti & Associates a Kathmandu based law firm, where he is leading commercial and research department. He holds Advanced Master (LLM) Intellectual Property Law & Knowledge Management (IPKM) degree from Maastricht University, Netherlands. He is also an executive member of New IP Lawyers Network, a wing of school of Law and its research centre SCule (Science, Culture and the Law) under University of Exeter, United Kingdom. He can be reached by   p.upreti@student.maastrichtuniversity.nl

EFILA Annual Conference 2016 – “Investment Arbitration 2.0”

The Annual Conference of EFILA 2016 entitled “Investment arbitration 2.0?“ will take place on 5 February 2016 at the La Maison du Barreau in Paris.

The Conference will bring together world-class dispute resolution practitioners and prominent arbitration experts to discuss the challenges and opportunities of investment arbitration, including the new features of investment protection chapters included in recently concluded or currently negotiated EU International Investment Agreements, like CETA or TTIP. In particular, the speakers will discuss pros and cons of international arbitration, the rule of law, including the complex issues such as transparency, right to regulate, protection of property rights and democratic deficits.

REGISTRATION FEE

The registration fee is:  299 (excluding VAT)
EFILA offers 50% discount on the conference fee to full time students and academics

PROGRAM

Conference programme is available here.

For registration, follow this link: REGISTRATION.